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Abstract:
Purpose: Within  the  process  of  project-based  supply  chain  inter-organizational  cooperative
innovation, the achievement of  project value-adding has been influenced by many factors like
the  effect level of  project-based organization and the relationship  within  project cooperative
innovation objectives etc. The purpose of  this paper is to provide a reliable reference for the
contractor reasonably allocate the effect level and resources between the knowledge investment
and  knowledge  innovation stage, and realize  the  knowledge collaboration for  project-based
supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach: This  paper  employed a methodology of knowledge collaborative
incentive model and example analysis based on the assumption of  equal cooperation  within
project-based organizations from the view of  maximizing project value-adding. By considering
the relationships of  effect cost between knowledge input and innovation stage,  a  knowledge
collaborative incentive model for project-based supply chain inter-organizational  cooperative
innovation was established, and solved through the  mathematic  first-order and second-order
approach, A simulation with example analysis were presented as a proof.
Findings: The  results  show that,  the  project  management  enterprise  not  only  could  achieve
project value-adding maximization, but also could realize the net earnings Pareto improvement
between  project  management  enterprise  and contractor by  adjusting  the  project  knowledge
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collaboration  incentive  intensity  and  implemented  knowledge  input-innovation  coordinative
incentive strategy.
Research limitations/implications: For simplification purpose, the knowledge flow in the hypothesis
of  the model is presented as knowledge input and knowledge innovation stage,  thus it  may
affect the final outcome of  the result.
Originality/value: During the practice of  construction engineering, knowledge management is
becoming more and more important to achieve project value-adding. This research provides a
theoretical guideline for the project-based organizations, such as the contractor and the owner,
especially on how to utilize their core knowledge perfectly.
Keywords: project-based supply chain, cooperative innovation, knowledge collaboration
1. Introduction
Construction industry is an information and knowledge driving based business line Construction
firms all over the world are increasingly being challenged by the pressure of  high-cost, over
schedule  project  and  continuous  growth  competition. Within  a  competitive  business
environment, the ability of getting the fast and reliable knowledge is a key factor for success,
and  the efficient handling of organizational knowledge is  particularly crucial as well (Ribeiro,
2009). Cooperation is necessary for achieving the continuous exchange of the organizational
knowledge flow; herein the cooperation among project-based organizations lays the foundation
of  knowledge  innovation.  The  collaborative  innovation  of  project-based  supply  chain  is  a
management mode where all project participators  organized by the cooperation contract to
balance interests of all parties, identify project objectives, establish perfect coordination and
communication  mechanisms  and  finally  realize  reasonable  risk-sharing  and  amicable
settlement of disputes (Fariborz, Fatemeh & Maryam, 2011). In this mode, teams with different
core knowledge usually establish and disband in terms of supply chain as projects proceed.
These teams form the project-based organizations of supply chain and play different roles in
supply  chain  inter-organizational  collaborative  innovation.  The  roles  played  by  clients  and
contractors are particularly important (Barrett & Sexton, 2006).
Project-based  supply  chains  provide  such  environment  that  enables  integration,  trust,
communication, coordination and other cooperation among project-based organizations. The
flexibility  of  project-based  organizations  makes all  factors  under  control that  includes
organization structure, project environment, social environment and transaction cost,  these
factors play  a  key  role  in  building  stable  partnership  and  promoting project-based
organizations  to  contribute  their  core  knowledge  consciously  and  willingness with  projects
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going on, which is the best approach for making project-based supply chains with more value-
adding  (Waroonkun  & Stewart, 2008). As the original drive for innovation, knowledge is an
essential factor in maintaining core competence of project-based supply chain, which cannot
be replaced in the appreciation of project value (Demaid & Quintas, 2006; Wu, 2011a). Supply
chains provide good environment for the transfer, assimilation, conversion and economization
of  knowledge,  given  which  condition  project-based  organizations  can  consciously  and
voluntarily offer  core  knowledge according to  project  knowledge requirement (Yim  & Kim,
2004). Therefore, the imperative problem now is how to establish the knowledge collaborative
incentive  mechanisms  among project-based  organizations.  For  project-based organizations,
knowledge is the most valuable assets and effective knowledge configuration underpins the
core process of the organizations because knowledge covers the best practice, operation and
management,  organization  and  learning,  problem solving  and  process  creation,  which  are
hardly  duplicated  (Ribeiro,  2005; Renzel,  2008; Kodama,  2005).  However,  due  to  the
discreteness  of  the  construction  industry  and  the  characteristics  of  the  temporality and
dynamics of  project  cooperation,  it  is  a  considerable  challenge  to  realize  the  inter-
organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains (Argote, 2000). Despite
the challenge, considering the significant role of knowledge for project success, more and more
project-based  organizations  expect  to  draw  the  support  of  the  outer  resources  so  as  to
enhance  their  capability  of  converting  collaborative  knowledge  into  core  competence
(Sammaddar, 2006). In regard to this problem, this paper employs the work of Mohamed and
Anumba  (2010) and  introduces the  concept  of  knowledge  flow  into  project-based  supply
chains.  We  define  knowledge  management  as  process  conversion  in  which  the  operation
environment  inside  organizations  are  set  as  input,  the  knowledge  flow  are  divided  into
knowledge  investment,  knowledge  assimilation,  knowledge  transmission  and  knowledge
innovation,  and  suppose that  project-based  organizations  can  obtain  interests  from  the
collaborative innovation. 
Figure 1. Processes of Inter-organizational Collaborative Innovation 
of Project-based Supply Chains Based on Knowledge Flow
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Based  on  the  above  discussion,  it  is  clear  that  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge
innovation  are  the  dominant  processes  of  supply  chain  inter-organizational  collaborative
innovation. The steadiness of knowledge investment and the balance of knowledge innovation
are the two important control objectives in adding project values. Since knowledge innovation
needs  a  steady  knowledge  investment  while  knowledge  investment  requires  proportionate
knowledge  innovation  as  a  prerequisite.  Both  processes  of  knowledge  investment  and
knowledge innovation have impacts on the realization of adding project values in different
level. However, the existing research usually focus on the knowledge flow influence on project
values adding  from the perspective  of  knowledge investment or knowledge innovation but
neglect the synergetic effectiveness of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation that
can  bring  the  maximum  project  value  (Wu,  2011b).  Therefore,  this  paper  selects  the
steadiness  of  knowledge investment  and  the balance of  knowledge innovation  as  the two
control objectives for realizing project values adding from a panoramic view of project values
adding.  Considering  the  alternative  of  effort-cost  between  knowledge  investment  and
knowledge  innovation,  this  paper  examined  the  effects  of  inter-organizational  knowledge
collaboration on  project values adding by means of  adjusting the  incentive intensity in the
process of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation as coordinating method.
2. Model Introduction and Solution
2.1. Model Introduction
To simplify the analysis, here we take owners as dominant enterprises and study how they
implement inter-organizational collaborative innovation with contractors. In the processes of
inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains, owners hold  the
absolute control and leadership that the other project-based organizations such as contractors
and raw materials suppliers have to assign the knowledge division and cooperation based on
the needs of owners. Under this circumstance, How the owners and contractors achieve supply
chain inter-organizational collaborative innovation value adding through knowledge investment
and  knowledge  innovation  becomes the key  considering  problem.  As  referred  above,  the
processes of the inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains
mainly  consist  of  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge  innovation.  Here  we  assume
contractors alone complete all knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, while owners
take charge of supervising contractors' work. Through the efforts made by contractors, the
knowledge  cooperation  of  the  supply  chain  inter-organizational  collaborative  innovation  is
expected to be reached, and finally project values can be achieved. 
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We first make several basic assumptions as below:
(1)  the  effort  level  of  contractors  in  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge  innovation  is
ai=(a1, a2)， ai>0； then the added value function of  project  values can be formulated as
follows:
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( , )R a a A a A a a aϕ ς= + + + (1)
where A1, A2 are the output coefficients of effort level in knowledge investment and knowledge
innovation, which take ϕ  as their correlative coefficient that represents new values created by
the synergism of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation.  ς is the external random
variable affecting project value added. To ensure the Hyers-Ulan stability of the function  as
above, ς is set to follow normal distribution: ς~N(0,δ2)；
(2) Suppose contractors' effort cost function C(a1, a2) is a completely monotonically increasing
function of ai:
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
1, ) ( 2 )
2
C a a a ka a aη= + +（ (2)
where k is the marginal cost substitution rate of contractors' efforts in knowledge investment
stage and knowledge innovation stage, which shows the impacts on marginal cost of one stage
caused by increase of effort level of the other stages. Since  
( ) 0C
a
∂ ⋅
>
∂ ，
2
2
( ) 0C
a
∂ ⋅
>
∂ , we assume
-1<k<1;
(3) Project management enterprises are risk-neutral and contractors are risk-averse; suppose
contractors' negative utility function is unchangeable with  absolutely risk-averse and can be
cumulated in space and time; 
(4)  Contractors'  effort  level  of  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge  innovation  can  be
measured.  We  define  x=(x1,  x2),  x1= a1+ε1 ， x2= a2+ε1 ， as  the  measurable  variable  of
knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, where εi  represents the influence of random
factors on x with the assumption that ε1 and ε2 are irrelevant and follow normal distributions
as: ε1~N(0, σ12)，ε2~N(0, σ22). x1 can be measured as the indicator of contractors' effort level
with the contractors' invested resources and degree of involvement in knowledge collaborative
innovation and  knowledge  investment stage;  x2  can be measured by  the  adoption  of  new
technology and new processes; 
(5) The linear contract compensation formula provided by project management enterprises for
the contractors is:
s = ϖ+ β1 x1+ β2 x2 (3)
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Where ϖ is the fixed compensation for contractors and is assumed as a constant; β1 and β2 are
marginal incentive intensity  provided by project management enterprises for contractors due
to the later' effort in knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, respectively. Based on
the  above  assumptions,  contractors'  net  current  incomes  expectation  utility  can  be
summarized as follows:
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
1( ) ( )
2
U s c a ρ β σ β σ= − − + (4)
where 2 2 2 21 1 2 2
1 ( )
2
ρ β σ β σ+  is contractors' risk discount that means contractors choose to give up the
income amount of 2 2 2 21 1 2 2
1 ( )
2
ρ β σ β σ+  to ensure their certain incomes. 
Project  management  enterprises'  net  present  value  incomes  expectation  utility  can  be
formulated:
U2 = R – s (5)
Then, the expectation utility of project values added is: 
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
1( ) (
2
U R c a ρ β σ β σ= − − + ） (6)
Under the background of asymmetric information, in order to maximize the utility function of
project  values  added,  the  project  management  enterprises'  collaborative  incentive  policy
making would be determined by a, β and k together on contractors' knowledge investment and
knowledge innovation:
max
ai , β i , k
U
s.t. a i , β i , k ∈ arg max U 1
a i , β i , k ∈ arg max U 2
(7)
2.2. Model Solution
We can have two stages to analyze the processes of inter-organizational collaborative innovation
of project-based supply chains,. At the first stage, owners decide the incentive amplitude β1 and
β2 to encourage  the  contractors on  knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. At the
second stage, with scenario of given β1 and β2, the contractors determine their effort level of a1
and a2 in knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. Therefore, by the method of inverse
solution, the first order condition of the synergetic knowledge incentives of inter-organizational
collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains is given as below:
1
1
0U
a
∂
=
∂ ，
1
2
0U
a
∂
=
∂ (8)
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Substitute Equation (2) and (3) in Equation (4) and  calculate  their derivatives respectively.
Then, according to Equation (8) we get:
1 1 2
2 2 1
( ) 0
( ) 0
a ka
a ka
β η
β η
− + =
− + = (9)
Equation (9) can be solved easily:
1 2
1 2
2 1
2 2
(1 )
(1 )
ka
k
ka
k
β β
η
β β
η
−
=
−
−
=
−
(10)
It  can  be  found  from  Equation  (10)  that  contractors'  effort  level  of  either  knowledge
investment or knowledge innovation is affected not only by the incentive amplitude at its own
stage, but also affected at the other stage. Substitute Equation (1), (2), (9) in Equation (6),
accordance with  Equation (7),  we’ve found that the first  order condition of the synergetic
knowledge incentives of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply
chains after optimization is:
1
0Uβ
∂
=
∂ ， 2
0Uβ
∂
=
∂ (11)
Namely, 
( ) ( )
2 3 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 2
1 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
( )(1 ) 1
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
A A k k A k A A k
k k k k
A A k k A k A A k
k k k k
ρη σ η ηϕβ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ρ η σ η ϕ ηβ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
 − − + − + +
=
− + + − + + + −
− − + − + +
=
− + + − + + + −
(12)
We specify
2
2
1( )
UA β
∂
=
∂ ,  
2
1 2
UB β β
∂
=
∂ ,  
2
2
2( )
UC β
∂
=
∂  and the second order  condition of  the synergetic
knowledge incentives of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply
chains after optimization will be:
B2-AC<0, AC<0, B2-AC<0, C<0 (13)
Additionally, we have Equation (14): 
2 2
2
12 2 2 2
1
2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2
2 2
2
22 2 2 2
2
(1 ) 2 0
( ) (1 )
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 0
( ) (1 )
U k kA
k
U k kB
k k
U k kC
k
η ϕ ρσβ η
β β η η
η ϕ ρσβ η
 ∂ − +
= = − − < ∂ − ∂ +
= = + ∂ − − ∂ − + = = − − <
∂ −
(14)
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Equation (15) can be obtained:
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 22 2 2 2 2
1 (1 ) 2[ (1 )(1 ) 1 2 ][ ( 1)(1 ) 1 2 ] ( ) 0
(1 ) (1 )
k kB AC k k k k k k k k
k k
η ϕη ϕ η ϕ ρ σ σ
η η
− +
− = − − − + + − + − + + + − + <
− −
(15)
According to the maximum value property of binary function, there exists βi* making U gets its
maximum  value.  Herein the  optimal  marginal  incentive  amplitude  provided  by  project
management enterprises to contractors under condition of synergetic knowledge investment
and knowledge innovation can be expressed as following:
( ) ( )
2 3 2 2 2
* 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1*
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
( )(1 ) 1
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
A A k k A k A A k
k k k k
A A k k A k A A k
k k k k
ρη σ η ηϕβ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ρ η σ η ηϕβ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
 − − + − + +
=
− + + − + + + −
− − + − + +
=
− + + − + + + −

(16)
Substitute Equation (16) in Equation (10),  and  the  optimal effort level contractors on given
synergetic knowledge investment and knowledge innovation will be obtained:
2 2 2
* 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2 2
* 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( 2 )
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
( ) ( 2 )
(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
A A A k A A k A ka
k k k k
A A A k A A k A ka
k k k k
ϕ η ρη σ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ϕ η ρη σ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
 + − + − +
=
− + + − + + + −
+ − + − +
=
− + + − + + + −
(17)
3. Model Analysis and Discussion
Result 1. When k≠0, there exists  a  linear relation between project management enterprises'
optimal  marginal  incentive  amplitude  and  contractors'  optimal  effort  level  on  synergetic
knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. When -1<k<0, βi will increase as k goes up,
which means knowledge investment and knowledge innovation are correlated in terms of cost
complementation,  namely,  an increase of incentive amplitude  at one of the two stages will
boost contractors' effort level at that stage, but diminish that at the other stage. When 0<k<1,
βi  will decrease as k goes up, which means knowledge investment and knowledge innovation
are correlated in terms of cost alternatives, herein, when raising incentive amplitude at either
stage will lift contractors effort level at both stages. When k=0, the effort cost of knowledge
investment and knowledge innovation is independent  respectively  and no  any impact to the
effort level at the other stage if the incentive amplitude at one stage is enhanced. 
Proof: the partial derivative of ai in Equation (9): 
Take -1<k<0 and 0<k<1 substitute in the above equations, and result 1 will be proved.
Result 2. As contractors' effort level of knowledge investment goes up, project values added
increase first, and then fall down. The maximum project values added can be reached under
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the synergism of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. Based on Result 1, project
management  enterprises  will  firstly strengthen the  incentive  amplitude,  then  decrease
incentive amplitude to their control objectives.
Proof: 
Take the partial derivative of ai in Equation (6):
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
1
2 2
2 1 2 2 1 1
2
(1 ) 0
(1 ) 0
U A a k
a
U A a k
a
ϕ β ρησ ρ ηβ σ
ϕ β ρησ ρ ηβ σ
∂
= + − + − = ∂ ∂
= + − + − = ∂
Substitute Equation (16) and Equation (17) in the above equations, then 
1
0U
a
∂
=
∂ ， 2
0U
a
∂
=
∂ .
The second order partial derivative of ai shows below:
2
2 2 2 2
1 22
1
2
2 2 2
1 2
1 2
2
2 2 2
2 12
2
(1 ) 0
( )
(1 )
(1 ) 0
( )
UA k
a
UB k k
a a
UC k k
a
η ρησ ρ η σ
ϕ η ρησ ρ η σ
η ρησ ρ η σ
 ∂
= = − + − < ∂ ∂
= = − + − ∂ ∂ = = − + − <
∂
Based on the extremism property of binary function, there exists (a1*，a2*) that makes U reach
its maximum value. By considering the value of k and the linear relation between project
management  enterprises'  marginal  incentive  amplitude and contractors'  effort  level  on  the
synergism of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, we can get the result proved.
Result 3. Under the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains, project
management enterprises' optimal marginal incentive amplitude is the monotonically decreasing
function of contractors' risk aversion level (ρ), which means the bigger the ρ gains, the smaller
of project management enterprises' incentive amplitude reflects (βi).
Proof:
Make the derivative of ρ in Equation (16)， then the result will be proved.
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2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 2
2 4 2 2 2 2
1 2
[ (1 ) ( )]{2 (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ]}
{ (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
( )(1 ) [ (1 ) ( ) ]
{ (1 )
A k A A k k k k
k k k k
A A k k k k
k
β η ηϕ ρη σ σ η σ σ η ϕ
ρ ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
η σ ρ η σ σ η ϕ η
ρ η σ σ ρ
∂ − + + − + + − +
= −
∂ − + + − + + + −
− − − + −
−
− + 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 4 2
2 1 2
0
( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
[ (1 ) ( )]{2 (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ]}
{ (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
( )(1 ) [ (1
k k k
A k A A k k k k
k k k k
A A k k k
η σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
β η ηϕ ρη σ σ η σ σ η ϕ
ρ ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
η σ ρ η
<
+ − + + + −
∂ − + + − + + − +
= −
∂ − + + − + + + −
− − −
−
2 2 2 2 2
1 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
) ( ) ] 0
{ (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
k
k k k k
σ σ η ϕ η
ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η

+ −
<
− + + − + + + −
Result 4. Project management enterprises' marginal incentive amplitude is determined not only
by the measurability of the exact control objective, but also  by the  other control objective,
given the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains. the measurability
of  contractors'  effort  level is  lower,  (i.e.  the  bigger  σ12 and  σ22),  the  smaller  the  project
management enterprises' marginal incentive amplitude.
Proof:
Inference 1. If contractors' effort level of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation can
not be measured, then:
( ) ( ) ( )
*
1
2 2
2 1 2 2 1*
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
0
1
[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
A A k A k A A k
k k k
β
η ϕ ηβ
ρ η σ η ϕ η ϕ η
 =
− + − + +
=
− + + + −
 or 
( ) 2 21 2 1 1 2*
1 2 2 2 2 2
1
*
2
(1 ) ( )
[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
0
A A k A k A A k
k k k
η η ϕβ
ρ η σ η ϕ η ϕ η
β
 − + − + +
=
− + + + −
=
Under this circumstance, the project management enterprises are unable to get information of
immeasurable  objectives,  thus  fails to  provide  effective  incentives  for  contractors.  In
consequence,  the  contractors  will  transfer  their  efforts  and  resources  used  on  those
immeasurable objectives to other more measurable objectives. In this scenario, the synergism
of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation cannot be achieved,  and project values
added become less than those under the synergism since project management enterprises can
incite contractor by their measurable effort level. If  (A1–A2 k)+A1 η2  (1–k2)+ηφ(A1+A2 k) = 0 or
(A2–A1 k)+A2 η2  (1–k2)+φη(A2+A1 k) =  0,  the  collaborative  relation  disintegrates  and
compensation provided by project management enterprises for contractors is just left ϖ.
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* 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1
[ (1 ) ( )]{ (1 ) [ (1 ) 2 ]}
( ) { (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
( )(1 ) { [ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
{ (1 ) (
A k A A k k k k
k k k k
A A k k k k k
k
β η ηϕ ρ η σ ρη η ϕ
σ ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ρη ρη σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ρ η σ σ ρη σ
∂ − + + − + − +
= −
∂ − + + − + + + −
− − − + + + −
−
− + 2 2 2 2 2 22
* 2 3 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2
2 4 2 2 2 2 2
1
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1
0
)[ (1 ) 2 ] ( ) }
( )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )[ (1 ) 2 ] ( )
{ (1 ) [ (1 ) 2 ]
(1 ) (
k k k
A A k k A k A A k
k k k k
k k k
k
σ η ϕ η ϕ η
β ρη σ η ηϕ
σ ρ η σ σ ρη σ σ η ϕ η ϕ η
ρ η σ ρη η ϕ
ρ η σ σ ρη σ
<
+ − + + + −
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Result 5.  When  the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains keep
consistence,  project  management  enterprises'  marginal  incentive  amplitude  is  decided  by
contractors' effort level at just one stage, but also at the other stage. Suppose contractors'
effort  level  at  one  stage  increases  (i.e.  A1 and  A2 get  bigger),  then  if  –1<k<0,  project
management enterprises' incentive amplitude increases too; if  0<k<1, project management
enterprises' incentive amplitude decreases; if  k=0, the output efficiency of  the  objectives is
independent respectively. Hence the increase of output efficiency of the control objective has
no effect on the incentive amplitude of the other objective.
Proof:
According to Equation (16), we work out the partial derivatives of A1 and A2:
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Substitute –1<k<0 and 0<k<1 in above equations and the result can be proved.
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4. Model Simulation and Case Review
Since contractors' fixed compensation ϖ makes no impact on project management enterprises'
incentives or contractors'  effort  level,  we assume  that ϖ = 0.  Therefore,  the problem we
consider here is how to maximize the interest of both project enterprises and contractors when
project-based supply chains add values after the cooperation. Based on model assumptions,
we define measurable variable x1 as contractors' level of participation in knowledge synergism,
x2  as the level of  new processes application,  A1 and  A2  are marginal output coefficients  at
knowledge investment stage and knowledge innovation stage,  β1  as the incentive amplitude
provided  by  project  management  enterprises  for  every  percent  increase  of  contractors'
participation level,  β2  as the incentive compensation obtained by contractors because of new
processes application. Here,  ρ =  0.6,  σ12 =  0.005,  σ22 =  0.01,  A1 =  45,  A2 =  45,  η = 1,
 φ = 0.5.
(1) Relationship between the effort level of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation
and project values added
Substitute Equation (9) in Equation (6) and make k as -0.5, 0, and 0.5 respectively, we will get
three different equations of U(a1, a2) as follows:
1 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 2 1 2
3 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
45 40 0.50225 0.503375 1.0045
45 40 0.5015 0.503
45 40 0.50225 0.503375 0.0045
U a a a a a a
U a a a a
U a a a a a a
 = + − − +
= + − −
= + − − −
We simulate the above equations with Matlab7.10 and plotted as shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Relationship between the Effort Level of Knowledge Investment 
and Knowledge Innovation and Project Value Added under Different k 
It can be seen visually that the simulation results under different k values are in line with
Result 2. As contractors' effort level of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation goes
up, project values added increases first, and then falls down. There exists (a1*, a2*) that allows
project values added reach the maximum. 
(2)  Relationship  between  project  values  added  and  the  incentive  amplitude  of  knowledge
investment and knowledge innovation. 
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Substitute Equation (9) and related parameters in Equation (6) and make k as –0.5, 0 and 0.5,
we will obtain three different equations of U(a1, a2): 
1 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
3 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
86 83.333 1.7778 0.2238 0.2253
45 40 0.5 0.5015 0.503
33.778 23.333 0.5544 1.1126 1.1141
U
U
U
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
 = + + − −
= + + − −
= + + − −
With the same method as above, the simulation results shows in Figure 3:
Figure 3. Relationship between project values added and the incentive amplitude of knowledge
investment and knowledge innovation under different k 
From Figure 3,  we can find  it  easily  that  with  different  k value,  simulation  results  are in
accordance with model analysis that is as project management enterprises' incentive amplitude
goes up, project values added increase first and then decrease,  where exists  (β1*,  β2*) that
make project values added reach the maximum. 
(3)  Relationship  between  project  values  added  and  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge
innovation synergism
According to Equation (1), (2), and (6), along with the related parameters,  we designated k
with  -0.5,  0,  and 0,5,  omitting the  influence of  contractors'  risk discount,  we deduce the
equations of R(a1, a2) and C(a1, a2) respectively as follows:
1
1 2 1 2
1 2 2
1 2 1 2
45 40 0.5
0.5( )
R a a a a
C a a a a
 = + +
= + −  
2
1 2 1 2
2 2 2
1 2
45 40 0.5
0.5 0.5
R a a a a
C a a
 = + +
= +  
3
1 2 1 2
3 2 2
1 2 1 2
45 40 0.5
0.5( )
R a a a a
C a a a a
 = + + +
= + +
Related simulated figures are shown as below:
Figure 4. Relationship between project values added and knowledge investment and knowledge
innovation synergism with different k
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Figure  4  reveals  that  the  influence  of  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge  innovation
synergism on project values added varies with different  k value.  Namely, the bigger the k
value, the shorter the distance between R and C, and the smaller project values added. Under
different knowledge investment and knowledge innovation synergetic conditions, the project
values added first goes up then fall down, during which process exists a equilibrium point that
leads to the maximum of project values added.
(4) Model example of knowledge collaborative incentive of project-based supply chains
Based on the model of knowledge collaborative incentive of project-based supply chains and
parameters designated before, we make k value as –0.5, 0, and 0.5, and solve the model. The
results including project management enterprises' net incomes, contractors' net incomes and
project values added (unite: 104 yuan), are listed in Table 1, along with the results acquired by
the incentive model that considers single objective for comparison.
k
Knowledge investment and
knowledge innovation
synergism
Knowledge
investment incentive
Knowledge
innovation incentive
(a1, a2)
–0.5 (43.83，41.39) (56.64，28.32) (27.93, 55.85)
0 (53.49，47.64) (53.49, 0) (0, 47.64)
0.5 (46.85，40.03) (74.97, -37.49) (–36.25, 72.51)
(β1, β2)
–0.5 (23.14，19.47) (42.48, 0) (0, 41.89)
0 (53.49，47.64) (53.49, 0) (0, 47.64)
0.5 (65.37，60.46) (56.23, 0) (0, 54.38)
project  management
enterprises' net incomes
–0.5 2436.10 1426.30 1364.58
0 2004.30 1200.33 1127.98
0.5 890.60 697.88 648.28
contractors' net incomes
-0.5 2501.11 1962.58 1426.30
0 1828.40 1127.98 943.20
0.5 908.11 864.58 856.17
project values added
–0.5 4937.21 3388.88 2790.88
0 3832.70 2328.31 2071.18
0.5 1798.71 1562.46 1504.45
Table 1. The comparison among the results of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation
synergism and that of single objective incentive models
Table 1 tells us that: (1) under the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply
chains, both project management enterprises' implementation of knowledge investment and
knowledge collaborative incentive and single objective incentive will  raise the project values,
and boost the incomes of project management enterprises and contractors;  (2) under actual
knowledge  collaborative  innovation  of  project-based  supply  chains,  no  matter  the  linear
relation exists or not between contractors'  effort  level at  knowledge investment stage and
knowledge innovation stage, the practice of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation
collaborative incentive is more effective than single objective incentive in  increasing project
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values added and all participants' net incomes. (3) compared with knowledge investment and
knowledge  innovation  collaborative  incentive,  single  objective  incentive  actually  improve
project values added at the cost of the other objectives. For example, when k=0.5, contractors
effort level at knowledge investment stage is higher than that under knowledge investment
and knowledge innovation collaborative  incentive,  but much  lower than that  at  knowledge
innovation stage.  (4)  under the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply
chains,  contractors  virtually  hold  higher  risk  than  project  management  enterprises,  which
makes  contractors  get  more  willing  to  implement  knowledge  investment  and  knowledge
innovation collaborative incentive to realize knowledge synergism. Under this circumstance,
the incomes of both cooperation parties will increase in different level.
5. Conclusion
This paper established and analyzed the knowledge collaborative  incentive model based on
inter-organizational  cooperative  innovation  of  project-based  supply  chains,  in  the  view  of
project values added and considering the effort cost alternative of knowledge investment and
knowledge innovation. Related simulation and model example were also examined. The results
show that under the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains, by
adjusting incentive amplitude at knowledge investment and knowledge innovation stages, the
implementation of collaborative incentive strategy not only can maximize project values added,
but  also  make  Pareto  improvement  for both  cooperation  parties.  All  these  will  urge  the
contractors allocate  the  resources and adjust  its  effort  level  at  knowledge investment and
knowledge  innovation  stages to realize  the  inter-organizational  knowledge  synergism  of
project-based supply chains. However, this paper has just considered the impact of contractors'
effort level on project values added, but make it impossible to analyze the scenario where the
mutual inter-organizational incentive between participants of project-based supply chains that
may optimize project management enterprises' effort level and adjust the resources allocation.
Therefore, the inter-organizational  bi-lateral  incentive of project-based supply chains under
knowledge investment and knowledge innovation synergism will be our next key research area
to raise project values added further.
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